By Selwyn Duke

In the wake of tragic Sandy Hook, many Americans are
desperate to prevent further school shootings. Thus do we find ourselves
debating two very divisive ideas: gun control and armed guards in schools. But
there is another idea, one both simple and acceptable to virtually all:
lockable, bulletproof doors for classrooms and school entrances.

This is a common-sense suggestion that has precedent. After
9/11, we had similar debates to those raging now. Today we’re divided over the
idea of arming some teachers; back then there was rancor over the idea of
arming pilots. Of course, we did finally appoint air marshals, the equivalent of
armed guards in schools. Yet no one had to debate what was universally self-evident:
the need to reinforce cockpit doors.

The cockpit door was a weak link that the 9/11 hijackers
exploited to gain easy access to the pilots and airplane controls. Likewise, Sandy
Hook Elementary’s doors were a weak link; they were locked at 9:30 a.m. and
video identification was conditional for entry, but murderer Adam Lanza was
able to shoot his way in. Yet school doors are a weak link that is easily
remedied.

There are many variations on the solution, each requiring
different degrees of expense and offering different levels of security. The
most secure option involves fitting all school entrances, as well as all
relevant rooms within a school, with bulletproof doors that automatically lock
upon closure. Here’s how it would work: all school personnel and students would
enter and exit the premises at one location, which would be manned when
students arrived at, and departed from, school. It would be closed at other
times, during which anyone who requested entry would have to be identified and
buzzed in.

A secure entry door alone would greatly reduce the
likelihood of another school shooting, but the inner locked doors would add
another security layer. They also would lock upon closure and could only be
opened manually from the inside. To ensure one couldn’t be locked out
accidentally or by a mischievous student, entry would also be possible via
electronic-key cards — the kind common in modern hotels — which would only be available
to school administration and would never leave the premises; the key cards and
their receiver units would also be reprogrammed periodically. If this is deemed
too restrictive, school personnel could be issued key cards allowing entry to
the school and some or all inner rooms, but this reduces security as it places
the cards in wider circulation, increasing the chances they’d fall into the
wrong hands (not the likeliest scenario, though).

Many may view this maximum security option as overkill, and
it would be expensive. But it would reduce the chances of future school
shootings drastically.

Another option involves lower-technology doors that could be
opened only from the inside, or from the outside with keys. This may involve
lower initial costs, but requires a sacrifice of security or a periodic change
of locks to take the place of electronic-system reprogramming.

Another slightly less secure option involves installing
doors that, while not necessarily billed as bulletproof, are for all intents
and purposes impenetrable. As an example, consider the standard entry doors of
homes and apartments in Poland, a nation I’ve visited. They often look like
something befitting Fort Knox — Chuck Norris couldn’t kick them down. In fact,
I was present when firemen broke into the apartment of a person believed to be
in distress; they had to use various tools, including a hydraulic device, and
it still took these professionals 10 to 12 minutes to gain entry. A lone maniac
with a gun wouldn’t have stood a chance.

Also note that Poles are poor by American standards, yet
they all seem to have such doors. So the cost for us shouldn’t be prohibitive.
These “Polish doors,” along with top-notch entry-door security, are probably
the most realistic option.

Less expensive still is to rely solely on the aforementioned
bulletproof entry-door security. After all, if you can control who and what
enters a school, what happens within it is of little concern. However, there
would be a problem if this one layer of security were breached. Thus, whatever
we do, there is no reason why schoolroom
doors should be unlocked during class — or be unlockable (a student could
still go to the restroom and be allowed re-entry.)

I’ll also mention that there already is an effort to address
this weak-link door (WLD) problem. It’s called
the JAMBLOCK, a lightweight piece of steel that can quickly be secured under a
classroom door, effectively locking it and greatly slowing the progress of
anyone bent on breaking in. The problem, however, is that it’s a half measure.
It doesn’t create the virtually impenetrable barrier my preferred solutions
would, and a teacher must become aware of a threat before it can be applied.
And, well, using a play on that old saying, I wouldn’t want mine to be the
first door a bad guy came through.  

Of course, nothing can completely eliminate the risk of
school shootings or any other danger. There would be vulnerabilities even if the
WLD solution were effected, such as periods when children filed in and out of
school, schoolyard recesses, and the possibility a student could have a weapon
hidden on his person. Yet other measures could augment the WLD solution. For
example, having metal detectors at the secure entrance, having the recess area
within view of that entrance and stationing one armed guard there would address
all three of those problems. All these measures taken together would perhaps reduce
the probability of another school shooting to near zero.

But this article’s purpose is to focus on the WLD solution.
And I’d like to make an appeal to those who would place emphasis elsewhere.
Whether or not armed guards are a good idea, they cannot be everywhere at once;
thus, advocating such without addressing WLD is like having air marshals but
not reinforcing cockpit doors. If your preference is gun control, please
consider that advocating such without addressing WLD is like outlawing box
cutters (the 9/11 hijackers’ weapons) but not reinforcing cockpit doors.
Neither option is a true substitute for a WLD solution.

Of course, mindful that the chance of dying in a school
shooting approximates that of being struck
by lightning, one could question the need for sweeping policy changes of
any kind. Yet given how these rare events traumatize the nation, become
politicized and used to advocate counterproductive policy, and that there is
clamor for a solution, finding one isn’t unreasonable.

And if we safeguard our money in bulletproof trucks and
vaults, can we justify a lower standard for our children? All of us, left, right,
and center, should be able to come together in support of the WLD solution. It
is common sense, can be common ground and, most importantly, would work.

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